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HORTON THE ELEPHANT INTERPRETS THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: HOW
THE FEDERAL COURTS SOMETIMES DO AND
ALWAYS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THEM
Donald L. Doernberg*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.1
made it worse, and that was after Dr. Seuss had pointed the way.2 The
Rules Enabling Act (“REA”),3 authorizing the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of civil procedure for the federal courts, limited the
Court’s power: “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”4 The Court has always struggled with that language,
from its first encounter in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.5 to the present. The
Sibbach test was whether “a rule really regulates procedure”6—hardly a
test of great precision. However, as the Court struggled to elaborate on

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A. Yale University 1966; J.D.
Columbia University 1969. I thank my faculty colleagues for their helpful questions and insights
during one of our faculty colloquia in the summer of 2012. I am also especially grateful to the three
research assistants with whom I have been fortunate to work on this Article: Lauren A. Bachtel,
Class of 2013, Gillian Kirsch and Ann Marie Bermont, both Class of 2014. They have been of
enormous assistance doing research and helping me to think through the thesis, and have been
exceptionally demanding editors. Such folks are treasures.
1. 132 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion).
2. See DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 16, 21, 26, 34, 38 (Random House 1990) (“I
meant what I said, and I said what I meant.”).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
4. Id. § 2072(b).
5. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
6. Id. at 14.
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the vertical choice-of-law doctrine7 stemming from Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,8 the REA was eclipsed for some years.
Questions involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal
Rules” or “Rules”) and the REA are simply a subset of that larger
problem—the choice between having state law or federal law apply to an
issue. The Judiciary Act of 17899 addressed that problem in two
provisions that have come to be known as the Rules of Decision Act
(“RDA”)10 and the Process Act of 1789.11 Since Erie—which is now
over the three quarters of a century old—the Court has spent
considerable energy addressing the vertical choice-of-law problem, but
with only mixed success.
In Shady Grove, the Court considered whether a federal class action
was maintainable in a diversity case where state law forbade class
actions.12 The justices were sharply split into shifting majorities. One
majority concluded that Rule 23 was not substantive for REA purposes
and that it applied, but its members could not agree on why.13 Four
justices thought it was proper to look only at the Federal Rule in
question to see whether it addressed substance or procedure on its face.14
A different majority supported an approach to REA questions that
7. Vertical choice of law refers to a choice between federal and state law governing a
particular issue. See Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and
Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 612 n.2
(2007) [hereinafter Doernberg, The Unseen Track].
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). The RDA states:
And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply.
Id.
11. ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1948). The Process Act of 1789 states:
And be it further enacted, That until further provision shall be made, and except where
by this act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided, the forms of writs
and executions, except their style, and modes of process and rates of fees, except fees to
judges, in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in
each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.
Id.
12. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010). There
is precedent for federal procedure permitting joinder in circumstances where state law would not.
See, e.g., Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238, 240-41 (D. Minn. 1942). In Jeub v. B/G Foods,
Inc., the defendant was allowed to implead a third-party defendant under Rule 14 even though state
law provided no impleader, but it did allow indemnity actions. Id. The court determined that
Rule 14 merely accelerated the timing of the state-recognized indemnity action, and therefore
Rule 14 had no forbidden substantive effect. Id.; see infra note 201.
13. See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text.
14. Shady Grove, 132 S. Ct. at 1442-44.
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required evaluating state law to determine whether the Federal Rule was
substantive.15 Because those justices forgot the lesson of Hanna v.
Plumer,16 the seminal 1965 REA case, their approach introduced new
uncertainties to an area that had been clearer17—which was a mistake.
The Court’s approach to Federal Rules problems from Hanna, in 1965,
until Shady Grove, in 2010, is preferable. It provides a historically
justifiable bright-line test for how to read a Federal Rule—as concerning
only matters to which the Rule directly speaks.
This Article proceeds in four further Parts. Part II briefly
summarizes the Erie doctrine and canvasses the Court’s approach to the
Federal Rules from 1938, when they took effect, to 1965, when the
Court decided Hanna.18 Part III takes a close look at Hanna, which
declared that a Federal Rule must speak with read-my-lips clarity to
apply to an issue.19 Hanna did not say that federal courts may read a
Rule for more than appears on its face, and Walker v. Armco Steel Co.20
continued that approach.21 Part III also discusses the implications of the
Hanna analysis and subsequent cases that have applied Hanna’s
approach.22 Part IV briefly canvasses the opinions in Shady Grove with
respect to the two approaches to REA questions.23 Part V argues that the
Hanna-Walker line of cases exemplifies the proper method of inquiry
under the REA and that REA questions need not be as hard as the Court,
particularly in Shady Grove, has made them look.24
II. VERTICAL CHOICE OF LAW FROM ERIE TO SHADY GROVE
From 1938 (Erie) to 1965 (Hanna), the Court used a single
analytical technique to decide: (1) whether federal common law could
exist, and (2) the scope of a Federal Rule. Hanna forever changed that,
holding that the REA calls for an analytical technique distinct from that
of the RDA, which governs whether federal common law can exist.25
Accordingly, it is a bit artificial to separate the Erie cases—regarding

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
See discussion infra Part V.
See infra text accompanying notes 29-82.
See infra text accompanying notes 83-111.
446 U.S. 740 (1980).
See id. at 750.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-58.
See infra text accompanying notes 172-209.
See infra text accompanying notes 212-42.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 473 (1965).
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federal common law—from the Federal Rules cases in the pre-Hanna
era. Nonetheless, looking backward from the post-Hanna era, the
importance of doing so is clear.
A. An Erie Précis
In 1842, Swift v. Tyson26 interpreted the RDA to permit federal
courts to determine common law rules independently of the states’
views, limiting the RDA’s command to state constitutions, statutes, and
“local” common law principles applying to immovables, chiefly real
property.27 Swift seems to have intended to foster development of
nationally recognized principles of general common law, leading to
greater uniformity in decisions among the states and in the federal
courts.28 That hope died when the states did not adopt those principles,
which ironically meant that Swift practically guaranteed disuniformity by
interpreting the RDA not to require application of states’ common law
rules. Not until 1938 did Erie overrule Swift.29 Justice Louis Brandeis’s
majority opinion sounded almost plaintive about Swift’s ineffectiveness:
“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of
common law prevented uniformity, and the impossibility of discovering
a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law
and that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties.”30 But Erie
created problems because it did not clearly set out what areas were
appropriate for federal common law. Thus, it bequeathed to future courts
the set of issues subsumed under vertical choice of law.
Make no mistake; Erie did not contemplate the demise of
federal common law, which explains why Justice Brandeis, quoting
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, was careful to specify the defect in
Swift’s doctrine:
[It] rests upon the assumption that there is ‘a transcendental body of
law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and
until changed by statute,’ that federal courts have the power to use
26. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
27. Id. at 18-19.
28. A word of explanation about “general law” is in order. Before Erie, there were three kinds
of law in the United States: federal law, state law, and general law. Doernberg, The Unseen Track,
supra note 7, at 617. The general law arose from a natural law conception, and it existed apart from
any sovereignty. Id. It was not federal law created under the Constitution. See id. For that reason,
the Supremacy Clause did not compel the states to fall into line. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Erie represents, among other things, the rejection of natural law theory in the United States in favor
of a positivist conception, long championed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Doernberg, The
Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 617, 621, 623-25.
29. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69, 79-80 (1938).
30. Id. at 74.
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their judgment as to what the rules of [general] common law are; and
that in the federal courts ‘the parties are entitled to an independent
judgment on matters of general law’:
‘But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far
as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not
the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in
31
England or anywhere else.’

Thus, Justice Holmes had articulated the positivist thesis, which Erie
adopted.32 That clearly did not eliminate the category of federal common
law because, in the very next case after Erie in the U.S. Reports, Justice
Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, applied a federal common
law rule.33
Erie left questions in its wake. When can federal common law exist
and when must the federal courts use state law? Erie was cryptic:
“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State, whether they be local in their nature or
‘general,’ . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such
a power upon the federal courts.”34 The second sentence suggests that
the federal courts’ common law powers are at least no broader than
Congress’s legislative powers. The first sentence may be even more
important because it connotes that Congress and the federal courts might
have the power to declare rules of procedure—a good thing, since
Congress had passed the REA in 1934, and the Court thereafter
promulgated the Federal Rules.35 Erie also bequeathed the question of
how to distinguish substantive from procedural law. Erie itself gave no
further clue; the word “substantive” appears nowhere else in the opinion,
and “procedural” does not appear at all.
The next attempt to distinguish substantive from procedural rules
for Erie purposes came in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,36 but it did not
involve the Federal Rules. The Court declared that, if applying a federal
law to a particular issue would change the outcome of the case, then the
matter was substantive for Erie purposes, meaning that the federal courts
31. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
32. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. at 533-34; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at
79; Doernberg, The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 617.
33. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
34. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
35. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). The Federal Rules first became effective in 1938.
See McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 65 (1939).
36. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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had to use the state law.37 In diversity cases, the Court said that a federal
court is, “in effect, only another court of the state.”38 But it is easy to
over-read that statement to connote either that all conflicts between
federal and state law result in the application of state law, or that Erie
commands so narrow a reading of federal law that it cannot conflict
with state law. The Court’s blanket assertion elides the Supremacy
Clause consideration.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.39 introduced a
balancing approach. The substantive issue was whether the plaintiff’s
decedent was a statutory employee.40 If so, only workers’ compensation
remedies were available.41 The procedural issue on which the Court
focused was whether the judge or the jury should resolve that
substantive issue. Under state law, that was an issue for the court; federal
law made it a jury question.42 The Supreme Court weighed the state
interests in application of the state rule against the federal interests in
application of the federal rule, and applied the federal practice because it
found the federal interest in controlling the internal working procedures

37. Id. at 109-10. Changing the outcome does not necessarily mean that one party or the other
achieves final victory. See id. More often, the choice between state and federal law either ends the
case or permits it to continue. See id. In Guaranty Trust, the choice of the state limitations period
ended the case with a dismissal. Id. at 100-01. Choosing federal law would not have given Grace
York a judgment for damages; it simply would have permitted the case to go forward for a decision
on the merits. See id. The limitation of Erie’s purposes is important. Laws may be substantive for
some purposes and procedural for others, as the law surrounding statutes of limitations illustrates.
See id. Guaranty Trust involved the question of whether York’s action was timely. Id. at 107. Under
state law, it was not. Id. York urged application of the federal rule of laches. See id. at 101.
Choosing the Federal Rule would have allowed the action to proceed; applying the state law
obviously would end it. Id. at 109-10. The Court applied the state law because it was outcome
determinative; that was the vertical choice-of-law rule. See id. at 110-12. On the other hand, in most
circumstances, for horizontal choice-of-law purposes, statutes of limitations are procedural. See,
e.g., PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.10 (5th ed. 2010) (noting “the traditional American
(procedural) characterization of the Statute of Limitations”). Suppose a second accident on the Erie
footpath occurred after Guaranty Trust and that the victim, as in Erie, sued in the Southern District
of New York. Assume that the relevant New York limitation was three years and that the relevant
Pennsylvania limitation was only two. The federal court, following Guaranty Trust, would apply the
limitations period that the New York courts would use because statutes of limitations are
substantive for vertical choice-of-law purposes. That requires the federal court to determine whether
the New York courts would use the New York or Pennsylvania statute of limitations. The New York
state courts would apply the New York limitations period rather than Pennsylvania’s because
statutes of limitation are almost always procedural for horizontal choice-of-law purposes. Thus, the
federal court would use the three-year period because it is substantive for Erie purposes, and New
York state court would have chosen the three-year period because it is procedural.
38. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108-09.
39. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
40. Id. at 527.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 533-35.
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of federal courts to be dominant.43 Outcome determinativeness was still
a factor, weighing in favor of state law, but it was no longer the entire
test.44 Important federal interests could outweigh outcome
determinativeness, as Byrd demonstrated.
Throughout those years, the Court did not distinguish the Erie
choice-of-law problem from issues involving the Federal Rules. Eight
years after Byrd, Hanna recognized that the inquiries were radically
different.45 After Hanna, with respect to choice-of-law matters not
involving the Federal Rules, the Court continued the analysis that
animated Erie and Byrd. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.46
considered a New York statute dealing with both substance and
procedure.47 On the substantive side, in cases where New York law
requires an itemized damages verdict, the statute makes the verdict
unlawful “if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable
compensation.”48 On the procedural side, the statute directs New York’s
intermediate appellate court to make that evaluation.49
In an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court divided
how it approached the New York law.50 The deviates-materially standard
was substantive for Erie purposes and, hence, had to govern in the
diversity action.51 The Court, however, balked at assigning the job of
determining whether an award violated the substantive standard to the
federal circuit court because of the conflict that would arise with the
Seventh Amendment.52 So, the Court played Solomon: while
recognizing that the damage cap applied, it assigned applying it to the
federal trial judge under Federal Rule 59, which, reflecting the common
law, had always allowed that court to order a new trial if the verdict was

43. Id. at 538-39.
44. Id. at 539-40.
45. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); discussion infra Part III.
46. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
47. See id. at 426.
48. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2013).
49. See id.
50. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428-31.
51. Id.
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury[] shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”);
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438. Before Gasperini, several circuits had reviewed a trial judge’s denials
of motions for new trials based on the excessiveness of the verdict, using an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Id. at 434-35. Gasperini explicitly approved such review. Id. at 434-36. Note, however,
that the suggested standard falls far short of the more searching appellate review that New York had
prescribed in section 5501(c). See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438.
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“against the weight of the evidence.”53 That avoided the Seventh
Amendment problem.
Note, however, that Gasperini was not a Federal Rules case. There
was no Federal Rule addressing damage caps. The Court called Rule 59
into service to accommodate New York’s substantive interest, using a
substitute federal procedural device rather than allowing the Second
Circuit to emulate New York’s Appellate Division.54 Above all,
Gasperini was a case in the Erie line, not in the Hanna line.
Accordingly, the Byrd analytical technique—balancing the state and
federal interests—led the Court to apply the state damages limit, but to
supplant the state’s procedural mechanism for enforcing the limit,
replacing it with a procedure consonant with the internal workings of the
federal judiciary.55 That is precisely what the Court had done in Byrd.
B. The Jurisprudence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 1965
Sibbach was a diversity action sounding in tort—automobile
negligence—presenting both horizontal and vertical choice-of-law
issues.56 The state in which the accident occurred and Federal Rule 35
permitted physical examinations of injured plaintiffs; however, the
forum state did not.57 The district court ordered the petitioner to submit
to a physical examination and, upon her refusal, held her in contempt.58
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Rule 35 valid under the REA.59
The Supreme Court affirmed that conclusion.60
The petitioner in Sibbach conceded that Rule 35 was procedural,
but argued that the forum state’s law conferred on her a substantive
right—a privilege to avoid physical examination—that Rule 35
abridged.61 The Court noted that, “[i]n order to reach this result [the
petitioner] translate[d] substantive into important or substantial rights.
And she urge[d] that if a [merely procedural] rule affect[ed] such a
right, . . . its prescription [was] not within the statutory grant of power
embodied in the [REA].”62 The Court clarified that “[t]he test must be
53. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356
U.S. 525, 540 (1958)).
54. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33.
55. See id. at 436-38.
56. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1941).
57. Id. at 7-8.
58. Id. at 6, 16.
59. Id. at 7-11 (discussing both the circuit court’s decision and the validity of Rule 35).
60. Id. at 16. However, the Court reversed the judgment, remanding the case because the
Federal Rules did not authorize contempt as a sanction for refusing an order pursuant to Rule 35. Id.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.
That the rules in question are such is admitted.”63
Thus, the Court rejected her argument, but the case is less important
for its holding than for its method. The majority never discussed whether
the state rule was substantive; it only found that—consistent with the
petitioner’s concession—Rule 35 was procedural within the meaning
of the REA, and, for that reason, it did not transgress the forum
state’s statute.64
Justice Felix Frankfurter saw it differently. He agreed with the
petitioner that the state law privilege, which the Court had recognized
before the REA, had ancient common law roots.65 Justice Frankfurter
thought this made Rule 35 substantive for REA purposes and a matter of
policy for Congress to resolve.66 He rejected the argument that
Congress’s acquiescence to the Federal Rules implied a change in that
policy.67 Thus, unlike the majority, he felt compelled to go beyond
merely considering whether a Federal Rule in the abstract addressed
substance or procedure, anticipating the Court’s division in Shady Grove
almost seventy years later.68
In Palmer v. Hoffman,69 the issue was whether the plaintiff or the
defendant had the burden of persuasion with respect to contributory
negligence.70 A state statute required the plaintiff to prove the absence of
contributory negligence.71 The plaintiff argued that, because Federal
Rule 8(c) made contributory negligence an affirmative defense, the
burden shifted to the defendant.72 The plaintiff’s argument was hardly
unreasonable; “affirmative defense” ordinarily signifies that the
defendant has the burden of proof on the issue.73 Yet, the unanimous
Court ruled against the plaintiff.74 Once again, the Court’s method, not
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id. at 11, 15-16.
65. See id. at 16-17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id. (“Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions
surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to draw any inference of tacit
approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”).
68. See discussion infra Part IV.
69. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
70. Id. at 116-17.
71. Id. at 117-18.
72. Id. at 116-17.
73. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (9th ed. 2009) (“The defendant bears the
burden of proving an affirmative defense.”).
74. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 117.
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the result, commands attention: “Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of
pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory
negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of
citizenship cases . . . must apply.”75 Palmer is the first example of the
Court reading a Federal Rule absolutely literally, refusing to infer from it
any meaning beyond that explicitly stated.76
Two years later, the Court decided Guaranty Trust and adopted the
outcome-determinative approach for resolving vertical choice-of-law
issues.77 It took only four years for Guaranty Trust’s draconian effects
on the Federal Rules to become apparent. A trio of cases in 1949
rejected applying three Federal Rules, two of which were clearly on
point.78 It became clear that, under Guaranty Trust’s approach, a Federal
Rule could apply only when it made no difference in the outcome of
the litigation.
The critical case was Hanna, and it demands close inspection.
Hanna departed from Guaranty Trust’s approach to the Federal Rules.
For the first time, the Court distinguished the vertical choice-of-law
inquiry in Federal Rules cases from the inquiry that Erie prescribed in
common law cases.79 Hanna held that a court evaluating a Federal Rule
should test its legitimacy under the REA, not under the RDA, 80 and that
made all the difference. The REA and the RDA have radically different
emphases. The default position under the RDA is that state law applies,
whereas the REA makes the Federal Rules applicable by default, unless
they “abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights.”81 The question is
what sort of inquiry that limiting language compels—a critical issue that
the Court did not consider until Shady Grove, more than four decades
later. Cases from Palmer (1943) to Hanna (1965) to Walker (1980)
75. Id. (internal citation omitted).
76. Palmer’s method thus anticipated the Court’s approach in both Hanna and Walker. See
supra notes 48-74 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
77. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1944).
78. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531 & n.1, 532-33 (1949)
(rejecting the application of Federal Rule 3); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
550 & n.4, 555-56 (1949) (rejecting the application of Federal Rule 23); Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (rejecting the application of Rule 17). In Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., there was a question as to whether Rule 3 actually covered the precise
issue for which the Court had to make a choice-of-law decision. 337 U.S. at 531 & n.1, 532-33. In
Walker v. Armco Steel Co., the Court subsequently held that it did not. 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980).
However, the other two of the three cases—Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. and Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co.—involved Federal Rules that were unambiguously on point. See 337 U.S. at
541; 337 U.S. at 535; infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
79. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 473-74 (1964).
80. Id. at 472-74.
81. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (creating a default application of state law), with 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (creating a default application of federal law).
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actually provide the answer, but Shady Grove overlooked the lessons of
those precedents, and, thus, went astray—making a relatively easy
problem appear much more difficult.82
III.

HANNA V. PLUMER: A NEW ANALYSIS FOR
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Hanna’s facts were simple. Plaintiff was in an automobile accident
with defendant’s decedent.83 Plaintiff filed a diversity action in
Massachusetts against the executor of the other driver’s Massachusetts
estate.84 The process server left a copy of the summons and complaint
with the executor’s spouse at their residence, in full compliance with
then-Rule 4(d)(1).85 The problem arose because the Federal Rule’s
service method was incompatible with a Massachusetts statute
that required personal delivery of process in actions against an
estate.86 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the state or federal
provision governed.87
The REA analysis was, to say the least, not overly rigorous. The
Court quoted the test it had articulated in Sibbach—“whether a rule
really regulates procedure.”88 A rule that governs service seems
quintessentially procedural, but the Court buttressed that conclusion,
referring to Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree.89 Murphree
recognized that:
[M]ost alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may and often
do affect the rights of litigants. [Congress’s] prohibition of any
alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed
82. See discussion infra Part IV.
83. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
84. Id.
85. Id. At the time, the relevant part of Rule 4, describing the method of administering service
upon a person, read as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof
at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1), in Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States Before the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 7, 7-8 (1937) (codified as
amended in FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)).
86. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958)
(repealed 2008)).
87. The lower federal court had dismissed on the authority of the Massachusetts statute,
relying, for that choice, on Ragan—one of the trio of cases that applied Guaranty Trust’s outcomedeterminative test to the Federal Rules. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462; supra note 78; infra notes 95105 and accompanying text.
88. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
89. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
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to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the
prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who,
agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before
90
a court authorized to determine their rights.

Justice John Marshall Harlan agreed, but he urged a more practical
analysis: asking whether the rule in question would “substantially affect
those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our
constitutional system leaves to state regulation.”91 He distinguished what
one might call real-world conduct from litigation conduct.92 His
approach was more specific than the majority’s, but it was still too vague
about what constitutes “primary activities.”
Hanna’s most important contribution was its recognition that the
RDA and the Erie line of cases are irrelevant to vertical choice-of-law
problems regarding the Federal Rules.93 The Court made a highly
nuanced distinction concerning Erie’s effect on Federal Rules cases:
The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true
that there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state
rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one
of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that
Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent
state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as
broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal
Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the
94
enforcement of state law.

It is critical to understand Erie’s current role in Federal Rules cases.
It plays no part in deciding what a Federal Rule means, to what
situations it applies, or whether it violates the REA. If a Federal Rule
does not apply, either because it is not broad enough or because the court
determines that it violates the REA, then the absence of a Federal Rule
creates a vacuum. Only then does the Erie analysis come into play,
filling the choice-of-law vacuum and directing that state law applies to
many, but not all, issues.95
90. Id. at 445; see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65 (referring to the Court’s decision in
Murphree).
91. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A]ny rule, no matter how clearly
‘procedural,’ can affect the outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed.”).
92. See Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision that Added to the Confusion—But Should
Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1203-04 (2011) [hereinafter Doernberg, The Tempest].
93. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-70 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 470.
95. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958) (demonstrating
the exception that state rules cannot disrupt the judge-jury relationship in federal courts); supra
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Some of Hanna’s less sweeping language applies to the REA
problem: “[T]he clash [between the Federal Rule and the state rule] is
unavoidable; Rule 4(d)(1) says—implicitly, but with unmistakable
clarity—that in-hand service is not required in the federal courts.”96
Later, the Court characterized the conflict as a “direct collision with the
law of the relevant State.”97 The Court noted that it had not previously
considered a case with such a direct conflict, and that the circuit courts
had anticipated Hanna’s approach.98 Lower federal courts99 and
secondary sources have since uniformly recognized that a direct
collision is necessary for a Federal Rule to oust a conflicting
state rule.100

notes 35-40 and accompanying text; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
437 (1996) (holding that state law may define the monetary limits of recovery, but federal law
governs which part of the federal judiciary evaluates the question). There are also cases involving
law that is substantive by any measure, but the Court has required the use of a federal common law
rule. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (approving the Fourth
Circuit’s creation of a federal-contractors’ defense to a state tort action); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (approving the use of a judicially generated act of state
doctrine in a state contract case). I have previously suggested that the vertical choice-of-law
problem yields to a different analysis from the one that the Court has articulated. Doernberg, The
Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 657-60. If one begins by presuming that state law applies to every
issue in every case in the federal courts, the presumption is rebuttable only by the existence of a
dominant federal interest—a federal constitutional rule, statute, or other rule—any of which
displace conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Doernberg,
The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 657-60. I stand by that analysis, but it does not purport to deal
with the quite distinct question of whether a Federal Rule is consistent with the REA. See
Doernberg, The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 659-61.
96. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
97. Id. at 472; see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 (1987) (“The initial step is
to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of [the Federal Rule] is sufficiently broad to
cause a direct collision with the state law . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & n.9 (1980), and Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72)).
98. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73.
99. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2011)
(choosing state law where there was no direct conflict between a state statute and a Federal Rule);
Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 42 F.3d 948, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding direct conflict between state
law and the Federal Rules, and finding that applying the Federal Rule was constitutional and within
the scope of the REA); Robinson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 840, 842-43 (N.D.
Ohio 2010) (citing the Court’s decision in Hanna as requiring a direct-collision between state law
and the Federal Rules, and applying the relevant Federal Rule).
100. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 330-31 (5th ed. 2007); JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 222 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that the court must act within
the scope of power authorized by the REA when there is a “direct conflict” between the state
practice and a Federal Rule); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 92 (6th ed.
2011); LARRY R. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 484 (4th ed. 2009); CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 403 (7th ed. 2011) (noting the
difficulty in the choice between state law and a Federal Rule where there is no direct conflict).
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Walker exemplifies how direct the collision must be. In Walker, the
petitioner sued in diversity to recover for personal injuries.101 The state
statute of limitations period required commencement of the action within
two years of the claim’s accrual.102 State law mandated that an action
commenced for statute-of-limitations purposes upon service—not
filing—of the summons and complaint.103 The petitioner filed within the
two-year period, but service did not occur until months after the
limitations period expired.104 The only relevant Federal Rule said
nothing about statutes of limitations: “A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the Court.”105 The district court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss for untimeliness, and the circuit court
affirmed.106 The unanimous Supreme Court traced the development of
the vertical choice-of-law doctrine with respect to procedural rules,
characterizing Hanna as requiring that “the Federal Rule [is] clearly
applicable,” and as requiring a “direct collision” that is “unavoidable.”107
Federal Rule 3 did not speak of the event that stops the running of a
limitations period: “There is no indication that the Rule was intended to
toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace
state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations.”108 The
Court explained:
Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state
law, the Hanna analysis does not apply. Instead, the policies behind
109
Erie and Ragan [v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.] control
the issue whether, in the absence of a federal rule directly on point,
state service requirements which are an integral part of the state statute
110
of limitations should control in [a diversity] action . . . .

101. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980).
102. Id. at 742-43.
103. Id. Service was good if made within sixty days of timely filing. Id. at 743. The Oklahoma
statute (since repealed) provided in pertinent part:
An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement
thereof, within the meaning of this article, when the party faithfully, properly and
diligently endeavors to procure a service; But such attempt must be followed by the first
publication or Service of the summons, or if service is sought to be procured by mailing,
by a receipt of certified mail containing summons, Within sixty (60) days.
Lake v. Lietch, 550 P.2d 935, 937 (Okla. 1976) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971) (repealed
1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Walker, 446 U.S. at 742.
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
106. Walker, 446 U.S. at 743-44.
107. Id. at 748-49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. at 750-51 (footnote omitted).
109. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
110. Walker, 446 U.S. at 752-53 (footnote omitted).
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Hanna and Walker thus require read-my-lips clarity from a Federal Rule
on the precise vertical choice-of-law issue before the Federal Rule can
displace state law. Hanna had it; Walker did not.111
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods112 echoed Hanna and
distinguished Walker. The issue was whether an unsuccessful appellant
in a diversity case was subject to the forum state’s mandatory
affirmance-penalty statute113 or to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
38, which vests the federal appellate court with discretion to impose
penalties.114 The unanimous Court reiterated the Hanna-Walker
standard, “whether, when fairly construed, the scope of [the Federal
Rule] is ‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the state
law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before the court, thereby leaving
no room for the operation of that law.”115 The Court emphasized that it
clearly intended Rule 38 to penalize only frivolous appeals, whereas the
state statute penalized “every unsuccessful appeal, regardless of
merit.”116 Burlington recognized an unmistakable conflict between the
two provisions. Rule 38 was within Congress’s power to regulate federal
procedure, which the REA had delegated to the Supreme Court, so the
state statute could not apply.

111. The lower federal courts have followed that explicitness approach. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (finding that Walker calls for
a plain-meaning reading of the Federal Rules, and eschewing the notion that the lower court is
required to construe Federal Rules narrowly to avoid direct collisions); Schach v. Ford Motor Co.,
210 F.R.D. 522, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that, since Rule 3 plainly fails to address tolling of
limitations periods, state rules apply).
112. 480 U.S. 1 (1986).
113. Id. at 2; see also ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (2012). The Alabama Code states:
When a judgment or decree is entered or rendered for money, whether debt or damages,
and the same has been stayed on appeal by the execution of bond, with surety, if the
appellate court affirms the judgment of the court below, it must also enter judgment
against all or any of the obligors on the bond for the amount of the affirmed judgment,
and the costs of the appellate court . . . .
ALA. CODE § 12-22-72.
114. FED. R. APP. P. 38 (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may,
after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond,
award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”).
115. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 4-5 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50, and Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)). In holding that Rule 38 governed, the Court relied heavily on Affholder,
Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1984), which refused to apply an
analogous statute from another state. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 6-7.
116. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 6 (citing Affholder, 746 F.2d at 308-09).
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The following table illustrates the Court’s approach with respect to
the Federal Rules:
Table 1
Case

Issue

State Rule

Federal
Rule

Choice

Rationale

Hanna

How must
service of
process on
an executor
occur?

In-hand
delivery
only

Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4:
substituted
service
permitted

Federal Rule 4
clashes
directly with
the state rule
and involves
only
procedure

Walker

What event
stops the
statute of
limitations
from
running?

Service of
process on
the
defendant

Fed. R. Civ. State
P. 3: “A
case is
commenced
by the filing
of a
complaint”

Burlington

Does a
mandatory
penalty
apply to an
unsuccessful
appellant
who has
gotten a stay
of execution
of the
judgment
pending
appeal?

Automatic
penalty of
ten percent
of the
judgment
plus
appellate
costs

Fed. R.
Federal Rule 38
App. P. 38:
directly
Court of
clashes with
Appeals has
the state
discretion
rule—state
to impose
law cannot
penalty for
control the
frivolous
internal
appeals
workings of
the federal
courts
(similar to
Byrd)

Rule 3 is
silent on
statutes of
limitation—
it is not
directly on
point; it does
not govern
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Note that this is not the approach that the Court requires or uses with
respect to federal statutes. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.117
provides a good example of the difference. The parties contracted for
plaintiff to market defendant’s copiers.118 Plaintiff was an Alabama
corporation; defendant was incorporated in Delaware and had its
principal place of business in New Jersey.119 The contract contained both
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses.120 The choice-of-forum
clause specified a state or federal court in Manhattan.121 When a dispute
arose, plaintiff sued in a federal court in Alabama, and defendant moved
for transfer to the Southern District of New York.122 The district court
denied the transfer motion because “Alabama looks unfavorably upon
contractual forum-selection clauses.”123 The circuit court reversed.124
The Supreme Court majority, as had the Eleventh Circuit,
characterized the problem as an issue of venue.125 Having done that, it
117. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. (Stewart Org. I), 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
118. Id. at 24.
119. Id.; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 3, Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (No. 861908).
120. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. (Stewart Org. II), 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam), aff’d, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
121. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 24. The Eleventh Circuit found:
Dealer and Ricoh agree that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the
Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement and
shall be a proper forum in which to adjudicate such case or controversy.
Id. at 24 n.1.
122. Id. at 24.
123. Id. The district court relied on Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala.
1980), abrogated by Professional Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347 (1997). See Stewart Org.
II, 810 F.2d at 1073 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). In Redwing Carriers, the relevant contract provision
purported to specify the venue for disputes. 382 So. 2d at 555. The Alabama Supreme Court,
however, read the provision as an attempt to limit Alabama courts’ jurisdiction:
In the instant case the agreement does not govern venue, rather it waives the
jurisdictional privilege of any domicile that the parties may be entitled to, divesting all
courts of the power to hear and determine the cause except the courts of Hillsborough
County, Florida.
....
We consider contract provisions which attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state to be invalid and unenforceable as being contrary to public policy.
Id. at 556. The contractual provision in Stewart Org. II appears to fit the Alabama Supreme Court’s
mold even more precisely than the provision that this Alabama court was considering. See supra
note 116. Nonetheless, the federal court in Stewart Org. II read it differently. See Stewart Org. II,
810 F.2d at 1069-70.
124. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 25.
125. See Stewart Org. II, 810 F.2d at 1067-68; see also Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 28
(referring to “the parties’ venue dispute”). Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting, vigorously contested
this characterization, viewing the matter instead as a dispute over the validity of the forum-selection
clause:
[T]he Court’s description of the issue begs the question: what law governs whether the
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was a small step for the Court to find that section 1404 also concerned
venue: “This question involves a straightforward exercise in statutory
interpretation to determine if the statute covers the point in dispute”—
and, accordingly, the Court concluded that the statute did.126 That
conclusion is unimportant for present purposes. The Court’s method of
construing the statute, however, is critical.“We believe that the statute,
fairly construed, does cover the point in dispute.”127 The Court noted that
it had already construed section 1404 to vest district courts with case-bycase discretion about whether to transfer a case. Justice Thurgood
Marshall noted that a forum-selection clause might be a powerful
consideration in the exercise of that discretion. “The flexible and
individualized analysis Congress prescribed in [section] 1404 thus
encompasses consideration of the parties’ private expression of their
venue preferences.”128
forum-selection clause is a valid or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the
parties. If it is invalid, i.e. should be voided, between the parties, it cannot be entitled to
any weight in the § 1404(a) determination. Since under Alabama law the forum-selection
clause should be voided . . . in this case the question of what weight should be given can
be reached only if as a preliminary matter federal law controls the issue of the validity of
the clause between the parties.
Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Pointing out that state law
almost invariably controls issues of contract validity, Justice Scalia argued that there was no
dominant federal interest, therefore, no reason to displace the state law that made the clause invalid.
See id.; Doernberg, The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 645, 647, 658-59. Justice Scalia also argued
that the policy underlying vertical choice-of-law doctrine in general supported his approach. Stewart
Org. I, 487 U.S. at 39 (noting that Hanna emphasized “discouragement of forum-shopping” as one
of Erie’s aims (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Court in Hanna had observed: “Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this
point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two rules
would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469. In Stewart
Org. I, it was easy to see that the difference in the federal and state approaches would affect the
choice of forum. See Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 24 (majority opinion). There seems little doubt
that, if the case had proceeded in the Alabama state courts, the defendant could not have relied
successfully on the choice-of-forum clause. See id. Thus, even had plaintiff filed there, defendant
would have had enormous incentive to remove and then to seek transfer. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404,
1441 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
Justice Scalia had a strong point, despite the disagreement of the other eight justices.
Nonetheless, for purposes of this Article, the critical issue is how the Court interpreted § 1404 for
vertical choice-of-law purposes, not whether it should have been looking at that section at all.
126. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 26.
127. Id. at 29.
128. Id. at 29-30. That may well be true, but, as Justice Scalia pointed out, perhaps the Court’s
first consideration should have been whether the clause was part of the contract under state law in
the first place. See supra note 123. Alabama law seemed to say it was not. See Stewart Org. I, 487
U.S. at 24. That does not necessarily mean that the district court should have granted defendant’s
motion, but, if Justice Scalia’s description of Alabama law was accurate, then the district court
would have had to find some other basis on which to rest a transfer order, and none was apparent in
this case. After all, defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
New Jersey, plaintiff was an Alabama corporation operating only in Alabama, and there was no
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The important thing is what the Court did not do. It did not rely
exclusively on the statute’s wording, but rather considered what it
inferred to be congressional intent, as well.129 Section 1404 says nothing
explicit about forum-selection clauses; it merely states general
considerations to which a forum-selection clause may be relevant.130
Contrast the Court’s inferential approach to the statute with its literal
approach to Rule 3 in Walker.131 Rule 3 says nothing about stopping
statutes of limitation from running, and the Court refused to read it to
have any such effect in diversity cases.132 Arguably, the case for giving
Rule 3 the effect Walker urged was considerably stronger, because
Rule 3 does prescribe the stopping point in cases governed by federal
statutes of limitation.133 But because Rule 3 was silent on the limitations
issue, the Walker Court ruled that it did not apply in diversity cases.134
Parallel treatment in Stewart would have resulted in the conclusion that
section 1404, silent on the issue of forum-selection clauses, also did not
control. Finally, if Walker had used the Stewart approach, it might well
have found that Rule 3, which does specify the event that stops federal
limitations periods, had the same effect on state limitations periods in
diversity cases.135
Thus, the Court treats statutes differently from Federal Rules for
vertical choice-of-law purposes. It looks to congressional intent and
apparent connection between the contract and New York. Id.
129. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 29-30.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
131. Compare Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 29-30 (considering inferred congressional intent),
with Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980) (requiring a literal interpretation of Rule
3); see also supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
132. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51 & n.10.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285, 287-89 (6th Cir. 1978); Bomar v. Keyes,
162 F.2d 136, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1947). The requirements of Rule 3 are also described in David D.
Siegel, Practice Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 3 cmt. (2008). Siegel explains:
Rule 3 provides the rule of federal practice that the filing of the complaint marks the
commencement of the action. The moment of filing is the key time to look to determine
whether the statute of limitations has been satisfied. As long as the complaint has been
filed on or before the last day—the assumption would run—the action is timely and the
summons and complaint can be served at any time during the 120 days that follow. (The
120-period comes from Rule 4[j].)
The foregoing is true enough as a general principle when jurisdiction is based on a
federal question, or any other ground of jurisdiction except diversity of citizenship.
When diversity is the jurisdictional basis for the federal action, however, Rule 3
emphatically does not govern for purposes of the statute of limitations. The rule
applicable in a diversity case to determine whether the statute of limitations has been
satisfied is taken from the law of the state in which the federal court happens to be
sitting.
Id.
134. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51 & n.10.
135. See discussion supra notes 121-25 & accompanying text.
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makes inferences from federal statutes in this area, just as it does in other
areas. But it will not draw inferences from a Federal Rule; instead
requiring explicitness if the Rule is to apply.136 Stewart muddied that
distinction to some extent because of its reliance on Walker and Hanna,
but, although it referred to the “direct collision” language of both cases,
it did not find a direct collision between the language of section 1404
and the Alabama rule.137 Justice Marshall’s opinion tacitly
acknowledged the difference: “[T]he ‘direct collision’ language, at least
where the applicability of a federal statute is at issue, expresses the
requirement that the federal statute be sufficiently broad to cover the
point in dispute.”138 There would have been no reason to make the
distinction if the Court intended to use the same approach with statutes
and the Federal Rules.
The distinction makes sense. The REA limits the Federal Rules by
specifying that the Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”139 No similar limitation applies to Congress’s
legislative powers; as long as Congress acts within its delegated powers,
it can, and often does, alter substantive rights, abolishing some and
creating others. That is what the Federal Rules cannot do, and a
structural reason underlies that limitation.
The Court, not Congress, creates and promulgates the Federal
Rules.140 Congress has effectively retained a veto power, but the Rules
are the Court’s.141 Whereas Congress is a majoritarian body, the federal
courts are counter-majoritarian. Therefore, the REA keeps the federal
judiciary from regulating substance, a majoritarian concern, in the guise
of regulating the federal courts’ internal procedure.
136. There is one case in which the Court held that apparently explicit language did not compel
application of the relevant Federal Rule. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497, 505-06 (2001). Semtek concerned the meaning of Federal Rule 41(b), specifically its language
about dismissal “operat[ing] as an adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 505 (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 41(b)). The Court concluded that the language did not mean that, in a case dismissed as untimely,
res judicata prevented the plaintiff from filing in another forum with a longer statute. Id. at 509.
Note, however, that Semtek is a case where even language one might characterize as read-my-lips
clear might not cause a Federal Rule to apply. See id. at 505-06, 509. It has nothing to say about the
propriety of going beyond the explicit language of a Federal Rule to expand its area of application.
137. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. 22, 26 & n.4 (1987).
138. Id. at 26 n.4.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
140. Id. § 2072(a).
141. See id. § 2074(a) (“Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in
which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.”). Congress occasionally
exercises that power, most notably with respect to the Court’s first submission of the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1973. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. See generally John
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) (discussing the problems
with regard to the application of the Erie doctrine to both statutory and constitutional interpretation).
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In Ragan, Hanna, and Walker, no one argued that Rules 3 and 4
established new substantive rights or abolished old ones. The Rules were
substantive only in the crabbed sense of Guaranty Trust, which declared
a federal rule substantive if the choice of a state or federal rule was
outcome determinative. Recall that Guaranty Trust itself did not concern
a Federal Rule; it dealt instead with laches. To say, as later courts did,
that a Federal Rule would have a forbidden substantive effect if applying
it was outcome determinative was a considerable over-reading of
Guaranty Trust. Hanna reflected that distinction:
[T]here have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state
rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one
of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that
Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent
state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as
broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal
Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the
142
enforcement of state law.

Now, if any court other than the Supreme Court had taken such a
position, the laughter would not even have been muffled because Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.143 involved a Rule arguably on point,
and the very same day, two other cases the Court decided—Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co.144 and Ragan—involved Federal Rules
unambiguously on point.145
Cohen was a shareholder’s derivative suit wherein the plaintiff held
a minuscule percentage of the corporate shares.146 While the case was
pending in a New Jersey state court, the New Jersey legislature enacted a
law requiring shareholders with small holdings to post a bond to
indemnify the corporation for “the reasonable expenses, including
counsel fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action
and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which
it may become subject,” in the event that the derivative action
was unsuccessful.147
142. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
143. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
144. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
145. See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531-33 (1949); Cohen,
337 U.S. at 555-56; Woods, 337 U.S. at 536.
146. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543-44.
147. Id. at 544 & n.1 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 to -17 (West 1946) (repealed 1968)).
The statute applied to shareholders with holdings of less than five percent or $50,000 of corporate
shares. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 to -17. The Court ruled that the statute’s imposition of the
security burden only on shareholders with a limited financial interest did not violate the Due Process
Clause. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 551-52.
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The New Jersey bond requirement was potentially inconsistent with
then-Rule 23.148 Although the Rule prescribed requirements for
derivative actions, it did not require a bond.149 The Court found that the
state law had a substantive purpose—limiting strike suits by
shareholders with little to lose—and was, therefore, more than simply a
procedural rule to control litigation in New Jersey courts.150 All of the
explicit requirements of Rule 23 could apply to the case without
conflicting with the New Jersey statute. Thus, the majority refused to
read Rule 23’s silence to oust the state-imposed bond requirement. In
this respect, Hanna’s characterization is accurate.
Justice Frankfurter, the author of Guaranty Trust, joined Justice
William O. Douglas’s dissent on this point.151 They argued that the New
Jersey bond requirement for a shareholder’s derivative action “does not
add one iota to nor subtract one iota from that cause of action. It merely
prescribes the method by which stockholders may enforce it.”152 Thus,
the dissent focused only on the elements of the shareholder’s cause
of action, and finding that the security requirement addressed none of
them, deemed it procedural for vertical choice-of-law purposes and
therefore inapplicable.153
Woods involved a state rule that forbade unregistered corporations
doing business in the state to sue in the state courts.154 Mississippi courts
had construed the law as governing only the capacity to sue, rather than
the validity of any underlying contract.155 Nonetheless, the majority
ruled that the state law closed the federal courts also, preventing a
diversity case from having an outcome different from what would have
happened in the state courts.156 The Court’s short majority opinion never
148. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 551-52, 555-57.
149. See id. at 555-57.
150. Id. at 556. “A suit (esp[ecially] a derivative action), often based on no valid claim,
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009).
151. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id.; see Doernberg, The Tempest, supra note 92, at 1185-92 (discussing an “elements”
approach and a “behavioral” approach to construing the Federal Rules for REA purposes).
154. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 536 & n.1 (1949).
155. Id. at 539 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Robert H. Jackson’s dissent explains:
The [state] statute follows a pattern general among the states in requiring
qualification and payment of fees by foreign corporations. State courts have generally
held such Acts to do no more than to withhold state help from the noncomplying
corporation but to leave their rights otherwise unimpaired. This interpretation left such
corporations a basis on which to get the help of any other court—federal or state—that
could otherwise take jurisdiction . . . .
Id.
156. See id. at 537-38 (majority opinion).
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so much as mentioned Federal Rule 17, which spoke directly to a party’s
capacity as a litigant and contained no disqualification.157 Justice Robert
H. Jackson’s dissent also failed to mention Rule 17, focusing instead on
the impropriety of federal courts giving state laws greater effect than the
states themselves did.158 It is, therefore, quite a stretch to say, as
Hanna did, that Woods construed Rule 17. Woods did not construe it; it
ignored it.
Ragan, like Hanna and Walker, involved service of process. It
resembles Walker (when to serve process) more than Hanna (how to
serve process). Ragan filed a federal complaint stating a negligence
claim within the two-year period that Kansas law allowed.159 Service,
however, did not occur until almost four months later, and almost three
months after the two-year period ended.160 The defendant sought
summary judgment for untimeliness, and succeeded in the Tenth Circuit
despite plaintiff’s argument that Rule 3 defined commencement as the
time that he had filed, not served, the complaint.161 The Supreme Court
adopted the Tenth Circuit’s view that under Kansas law, only service,
not filing, commenced the action.162 “[The] local law undertook to
determine the life of the cause of action. We cannot give it a longer life
in the federal court than it would have had in the state court without

157. See id. at 535-59; FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) (1946) (amended 1948). Federal Rule 17(b)
stated:
Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than the one acting in a
representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile.
The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under
which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined
by the law of the State in which the district court is held; except (1) that a partnership or
other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the name of such State,
may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a
substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that
the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United States to sue or be sued in a
court of the United States is governed by Rule 66.
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).
158. Woods, 337 U.S. at 538-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
159. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531 (1949); see KAN. GEN.
STATS. 1935, § 60-306.
160. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531.
161. See id. at 532. “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 3.
162. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532-34; see also KAN. GEN. STATS. 1935, § 60-308 (“An action
shall be deemed commenced within the meaning of this article, as to each defendant, at the date of
the summons which is served on him . . . .”). Although Ragan obviously viewed it differently, one
could read the Kansas statute to be consistent with Rule 3, because the statute refers to “the date of
the summons,” not the date of the service. See § 60-308. But the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion that
the Supreme Court noted “a distinguished member of the Kansas bar” had written, read it
differently. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 534.
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adding something to the cause of action. We may not do that
consistently with Erie . . . .”163
In Ragan, the clash between state rules and the Federal Rule was
direct: each specified the date of commencement of a civil action. The
Court’s selection of the state definition is, perhaps, not surprising since,
by its terms, it applied to the limitations period in Ragan. It is a bit
surprising that the Court never discussed the scope of Rule 3. It simply
relied on Guaranty Trust in finding that using Rule 3 would produce a
different result in federal court from the outcome that would result in
state court, thus violating Erie. There was no mention of the REA; the
Court passed up the opportunity to explore whether applying Rule 3
would have violated the REA. Ragan clearly rests on Guaranty Trust,
not on the REA or any narrowing construction of Rule 3, so Hanna’s
view of Ragan—as a case construing Rule 3—is as inaccurate as
Hanna’s view of Woods.
Hanna criticized Ragan for misunderstanding the proper inquiry.164
Hanna’s contribution to the vertical choice-of-law issue was recognizing
that the analytical technique of Erie, Guaranty Trust, and Byrd is
entirely inapplicable to: (1) the scope of a Federal Rule and (2) whether
a Federal Rule contravenes the REA.165 That is what some of the justices
who decided Shady Grove forgot.
IV.

SHADY GROVE’S UMBRA

Shady Grove is a difficult case to digest. New York requires
automobile insurers to pay no-fault insurance claims within thirty days
of receipt, or to pay two percent per month interest on the delayed
amount plus reasonable attorney’s fees.166 Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates (“Shady Grove”) claimed that Allstate Insurance Company
(“Allstate”) improperly delayed payment and owed approximately five
hundred dollars in interest.167 Normally, the diversity jurisdiction
163. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533-34.
164. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476-77 (1965).
165. That is not to say that the Erie analysis is inapplicable to any procedural question. If there
is no Federal Rule directly on point, or if there is such a Rule but the Court determines that the Rule
violates the limiting language of the REA, then the Erie analysis becomes appropriate. See supra
notes 86-94 and accompanying text. The Erie analysis operates only when there is a vacuum of
positive federal law—where no constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision governs the issue.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Then, and then only, the question becomes whether the
federal court should create federal common law, and the Erie analysis, as developed in the
subsequent cases, addresses that question. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
166. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2009).
167. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 (E.D.N.Y.
2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). As the district court
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statute168 would bar the federal courts from hearing such a small claim,
but Shady Grove had filed a federal class action under diversity
jurisdiction, alleging “that Allstate routinely fails to pay covered claims
for first-party no-fault benefits within the statutorily mandated time
period and routinely ignores its obligation to pay the statutory interest
owed in such cases.”169 Pleading a class action raised the amount in
controversy to more than five million dollars, which allowed Shady
Grove to file in federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act
(“CAFA”).170 The problem arose because a provision of New York’s
Civil Practice Law and Rules—section 901(b)—forbade maintenance of
New York class actions to recover penalties.171 Both the district and
circuit courts viewed the interest provision as a penalty, and, therefore,
refused class certification.172
The Supreme Court confronted two issues: (1) what the analytical
technique should be, and (2) what the result in the case should be. Each
issue produced a five-to-four majority vote, but the majorities’
membership shifted. Even within each majority there were serious
differences. Five justices agreed that the class action could proceed, but
Justice John Paul Stevens differed with Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality
about the appropriate analytical method.173 Four other justices disagreed
recited, Allstate eventually paid the underlying claims, but withheld the interest payments it
allegedly owed under the statute. See id.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
169. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 & n.3. Unlike the
stringent requirements of general diversity jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA
requires only minimal diversity of the parties as long as at least five million dollars is in
controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent specifically accused Shady Grove
of “attempt[ing] to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at
1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). There is a certain irresistible irony to the CAFA’s operation, as
Justice Ginsburg described it. One of Congress’s clear purposes in enacting the CAFA was to make
it possible for class action defendants to remove such actions from state “magnet jurisdictions” to
the federal courts. See generally Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008) (discussing the purposes and impact of the
CAFA). In Shady Grove, the CAFA had the (probably) unintended effect of making the federal
court the magnet jurisdiction. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 & n.3. Adding to the irony, the
United States is a magnet jurisdiction for international cases. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, The
United States as a Magnet Forum and What, if Anything, to Do About It, in INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 213, 216 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed.,
1997).
171. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (“Unless a statute creating or imposing a
penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class
action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by
statute may not be maintained as a class action.”).
172. See Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 146; Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 471, 473.
173. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37, 1442-44. Justice Scalia announced the judgment
and wrote a majority opinion with respect to the facts of the case, its procedural history, and the
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both with the result and with Justice Scalia’s analytical method.174
Justice Stevens agreed with the dissent on method, but was unable to
agree on how it applied in Shady Grove.175
The split over the proper technique commands attention. Justice
Scalia approached the REA issue from the federal side, looking only at
Rule 23, not at state law, to decide whether Rule 23 was substantive
within the meaning of the REA. “What matters is what the rule itself
regulates: If it governs only ‘the manner and means’ by which the
litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision
by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.”176 Justice
Scalia thus ruled out considering whether the conflicting state law had a
substantive purpose. In Shady Grove, the state rule may have reflected a
substantive policy, that is, the legislature’s desire to avoid penalty cases
unavoidability of a direct clash between Federal Rule 23 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 901(b)—and,
hence, the necessity of evaluating Rule 23 under the REA. Id. at 1436-42. Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justices Stevens, Justice Thomas, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in that view. Id.
The remainder of his opinion discussed the proper technique for making REA evaluations. Id. at
1442-44. The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Sotomayor joined Part II-B and II-D of the
opinion. See id. Only the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined Part II-C, which was a reply to
Justice Stevens’s partial concurrence and concurrence in the judgment. Id. at 1444-48. Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito, wrote an
extended dissent. See id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-42 (majority opinion). Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined
by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. See id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 1463 n.2. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, “a majority of this Court, it bears
emphasis, agrees that Federal Rules should be read with moderation in diversity suits to
accommodate important state interests.” Id. See generally Symposium, Erie Under Advisement: The
Doctrine After Shady Grove, 44 AKRON L. REV. 897 (2011) (containing several articles discussing
the Shady Grove opinions in depth).
176. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (majority opinion) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). Note, however, that Justice Scalia’s position in Semtek Int’l
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. seems more nuanced than Shady Grove’s simple statement. 531 U.S.
497 (2001). Semtek, begun in the California state courts and then removed by the defendant,
suffered dismissal in the district and circuit courts because the plaintiff had overrun California’s
two-year limitation period. Id. at 499. The district court specified that it was dismissing plaintiff’s
claims—under Federal Rule 41(b)—“in [their] entirety on the merits and with prejudice.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The issue was whether that designation precluded litigation in
Maryland, which had a longer limitations period. Id. The Court ruled that it did not, notwithstanding
Rule 41(b)’s apparently clear language. Id. at 509. Justice Scalia declined to take the Rule’s
wording at face value: “[I]t would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be
accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the internal procedures of
the rendering court itself.” Id. at 503. Justice Scalia also added a statement that seems at odds with
his later position in Shady Grove: “Indeed, such a rule would arguably violate the jurisdictional
limitation of the Rules Enabling Act.” Id. Perhaps so, but Rule 41(b) contains nothing with respect
to “the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,” because, as Justice
Scalia himself pointed out, “the traditional rule is that expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations merely bars the remedy and does not extinguish the substantive right, so that dismissal
on that ground does not have claim-preclusive effect in other jurisdictions with longer, unexpired
limitations periods.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442; Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504.
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inflicting ruinous damages on a party.177 For Justice Scalia and his three
colleagues, “the substantive nature of New York’s law, or its substantive
purpose, makes no difference.”178 The issue was not whether the state
law is substantive, but rather whether the Federal Rule is. Rule 23
addresses nothing substantive—no elements of a cause of action or
defense on the merits179—and, therefore, it does not violate the REA.
The other five justices saw it differently. They declined to say
whether a Federal Rule has a REA-impermissible effect without first
looking at the state rules and the extent to which they embody or reflect
substantive state policies. On that principle the five were united, but
they were unable to agree that section 901(b) represented a substantive
state policy.
Justice Stevens concluded that New York’s limitation was, for
REA purposes, procedural only.180 He diverged from Justice Scalia,
asserting that:
It is important to observe that the balance Congress has struck [in
the RDA and REA] turns, in part, on the nature of the state law that is
being displaced by a federal rule. And in my view, the application of
that balance does not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue
takes the form of what is traditionally described as substantive or
procedural. Rather, it turns on whether the state law actually is part of
181
a State’s framework of substantive rights and remedies.

For Justice Stevens, it was appropriate to focus both on the state and
federal laws. Federal Rule 23 clearly covered whether Shady Grove
could maintain its suit as a class action.182 Therefore, he, like Justice
Scalia’s plurality, had to consider whether applying Rule 23 would
violate the REA. Justice Scalia’s plurality had only to read Rule 23 to
make that decision.183 Justice Stevens apparently thought that approach
was unrealistic because it considered the scope of the Federal Rule as if
the Rule operated in a vacuum. In his view, the REA’s limitation
177. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that there were several indications that the New York
legislature had substantive goals in mind when it enacted section 901(b). See Shady Grove, 130
S. Ct. at 1465-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Governor Hugh Carey’s signing statement
and the practice commentaries). Justice Scalia disputed the evidence. See id. at 1440 (majority
opinion) (“This evidence of the New York Legislature’s purpose is pretty sparse.”).
178. Id. at 1444.
179. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
180. “The New York law at issue . . . is a procedural rule that is not part of New York’s
substantive law.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (internal citation
omitted).
181. Id. at 1449.
182. See id. at 1456-57.
183. See id. at 1437 (majority opinion).
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compelled examining the state law to see whether applying the Federal
Rule would “abridge, enlarge or modify” some substantive right.184 In
effect, though not explicitly, Justice Scalia’s plurality thought that the
REA required evaluating a Federal Rule only on its face, whereas Justice
Stevens wanted to consider REA challenges on an as-applied basis.185
Several factors persuaded Justice Stevens that New York’s rule was
only procedural. He relied in part on New York’s designation of the rule
as procedural.186 He also noted the costs to the federal judiciary of trying
to discern when an ostensibly procedural state provision, in fact,
embodies a state substantive policy.187 Finally, he effectively established
a rebuttable presumption favoring the Federal Rule by stating that: “[t]he
mere possibility that a federal rule would alter a state-created right is not
sufficient. There must be little doubt.”188
Justice Stevens also argued: (1) that since the New York rule
applied to all penalty class actions—not only those based on New York
law—the Court should not understand it to reflect New York’s
substantive policy, and (2) before New York enacted the class action
statute relevant to Shady Grove, plaintiff classes could maintain penalty
class actions in the federal courts, “and New York had done nothing to
prevent that.”189 It is difficult to follow his reasoning here; his second
point overlooked the possibility that section 901(b) was New York doing
something. It is almost as if he was saying that New York’s legislature
had let too much time elapse since the passage of the CAFA before
attempting to limit penalty class actions in the federal courts, and, hence,
was estopped from expecting the federal courts to read section 901(b) as
such a limit.
Justice Stevens’s first point is similarly confusing. He seemed to
assume that, because section 901(b) would affect class actions not based
on New York law, the legislature must not have had a substantive policy.
Why should that be so? That the limitation might have ancillary effects
on non-New York claims tells nothing about the effect the legislature
intended for claims that did sound in New York law. Perhaps the statute
184. Id. at 1449, 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
185. Id. at 1459. Justice Stevens made that clear in the subheading he used—“Applying Rule 23
Does Not Violate the Enabling Act”—after finding, and using as a sub-heading, the fact that “Rule
23 Controls Class Certification.” Id. at 1456-57.
186. Id. at 1457. “The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule suggests it
reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate and not a judgment about state-created
rights and remedies.” Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.

2014]

HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS UNDERSTAND THE FRCP

827

had more than one purpose; the legislature may have designed it both to
limit recovery of New York penalties in class actions and to prevent
New York from becoming a magnet jurisdiction for penalty class actions
based on other states’ laws. It is impossible to tell; the sparse legislative
history only hints that the legislature was concerned about “annihilating
punishment of the defendant.”190
Finally, Justice Stevens mentioned the argument that class actions
are unnecessary to give claimants incentive to sue in penalty cases and
might be unduly cumbersome.191 This enabled him to view
section 901(b) as a procedural calibration device,192 rather than as a
substantive limitation reflecting a policy judgment on appropriate levels
of liability in statutory penalty cases.193
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent interpreted section 901(b) and its history
differently from Justice Stevens.194 She traced the sparse legislative
history, quoted the New York Court of Appeals at length, and concluded
that the legislature included section 901(b) as a substantive limitation on
statutory penalties.195 “[T]he Court gives no quarter to New York’s
190. Id. at 1458 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901 cmt. 11 (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also supra note 166.
191. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1458-59.
192. Id. at 1459.
193. Consider also that section 901(b) does nothing to limit an insurer’s total exposure to
penalties. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 901(b). There is no limit on the number of individual claimants
who can sue, and there is nothing in New York law that would prevent consolidation of such actions
under article 6 of the C.P.L.R., which would lead to just as large a single judgment in the
consolidated action as plaintiffs could obtain in a class action. See Doernberg, The Tempest, supra
note 92, at 1174-75 & nn.159-61.
194. Justice Ginsburg’s summary of the vertical choice-of-law doctrine, in Part I-A of her
dissenting opinion, overstates the RDA’s effect in diversity actions: “[T]he Rules of Decision
Act . . . prohibits federal courts from generating substantive law in diversity actions.” Shady Grove,
130 S. Ct. at 1460-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). That statement is generally, but
not universally, true. Two well known cases demonstrate that the federal courts can (and should)
sometimes generate substantive law in diversity actions when there is a dominant federal interest.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg did not cite either case. See Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460-73.
195. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464. Justice Ginsberg stated in dissent:
While the Judicial Conference proposal was in the New York Legislature’s hopper,
“various groups advocated for the addition of a provision that would prohibit class action
plaintiffs from being awarded a statutorily-created penalty . . . except when expressly
authorized in the pertinent statute.” These constituents “feared that recoveries beyond
actual damages could lead to excessively harsh results.” “They also argued that there
was no need to permit class actions [because] statutory penalties . . . provided an
aggrieved party with a sufficient economic incentive to pursue a claim.” Such penalties,
constituents observed, often far exceed a plaintiff’s actual damages. “When lumped
together,” they argued, “penalties and class actions produce overkill.”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012,
1015 (N.Y. 2007), and Letter from Gary J. Perkinson, Exec. Dir., N.Y. Council of Retail Merchs.,
Inc., to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor of N.Y. (June 4, 1975), in S. Rep. No. 1309-8, ch. 207
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limitation on statutory damages.”196 And yet, comparing section 901(b)
to a statutory cap on damages, as Justice Ginsburg did when she likened
section 901(b) to the New York statute involved in Gasperini, elides a
highly significant difference.197 In Gasperini, the New York statute
expressly placed a limitation on total damages.198
Contrast the Gasperini statute with the Shady Grove statute. The
latter places no limit on an insurer’s exposure to statutory damages; it
merely makes the total amount unrecoverable in a state class action.199
Perhaps the New York legislature, yielding to pressure from insurers,
wanted to take the class action device off the table, but it did not
limit any insurer’s total liability for statutory damages.200 Gasperini,
rather than buttressing the dissenters’ argument, should have been
a caution. The New York legislature obviously knows how to limit

(N.Y. 1975)).
One might question the incentive argument in the context of Shady Grove. Shady Grove’s
claim was for approximately $500. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (majority opinion). One
month’s interest at two percent thus would be less than ten dollars, a paltry incentive to undertake
litigation with all of its attendant expenses and stress. See id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
That aside, the argument that the “various groups” made, referenced in Justice Ginsberg’s
dissent, boils down to an argument against statutory penalties generally—or, at least, those that one
might view as “disproportionate” to actual damages. See id. at 1464. Yet, the argument overlooks
the reasons for having statutory penalties in the first place. Penalties are supposed to punish, and the
Supreme Court has compared their purpose to that of punitive damages. See, e.g., State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416, 418 (2003) (suggesting that punitive damages be
compared to civil penalty amounts to help determine whether punitive damages are excessive).
196. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464.
197. Id. (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996)).
198. “In reviewing a money judgment in an action in which an itemized verdict is
required . . . the appellate division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it
deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)
(McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2010). That the limitation is not a specific dollar amount—see, for
example, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997) (requiring noneconomic losses to medical
malpractice victim not to exceed $250,000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302 (West 2005)
(limiting medical malpractice recovery amounts to $1,000,000—though the court may make an
exception “upon good cause shown”—of which no more than $250,000 can be noneconomic loss);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09(b)(1) (West 2011) (limiting noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice cases to $650,000 through 2008 with the limit to increase thereafter by
$15,000 per year); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301(c) (West 2012) (limiting
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to $250,000 per provider with an absolute
maximum of $500,000)—is unimportant. The legislature clearly believed that there was a figure that
a court could determine was “reasonable compensation,” and the legislature instructed New York’s
appellate courts not to permit more than an immaterial deviation from that figure.
199. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1471-72.
200. It is also possible that the legislature concluded that the nature of penalty class actions was
such that, to borrow the wording of Federal Rule 23, “the questions of law or fact common to class
members [do not] predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is [not] superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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total damages when it wants to, but it refrained in the context of
statutory penalties.201
Justice Ginsburg characterized New York’s law as a limit on
liability simpliciter.202 It is not; it is, instead, a limit on New York’s use
of its class action device. As she correctly pointed out, New York law
does not “allow class members to recover statutory damages because the
New York legislature considered the result of adjudicating such claims
en masse to be exorbitant.”203 She was speaking of recovery “in a single
suit.”204 But, by the same token, it does not prevent total recovery of
statutory damages by every claimant whose insurer unlawfully delays
reimbursement. Allstate has no right, under New York law, to an
exemption from paying interest to each person to whom it unlawfully
delayed paying benefits.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued that Shady Grove was inconsistent
with Cohen.205 In Cohen, the Court had read then-Rule 23 to permit the
New Jersey bond requirement to function as an “add-on” to the Federal
Rule, since the Rule said nothing about bonds.206 Justice Ginsburg, in
Shady Grove, argued that the Court should permit an analogous result by
allowing the New York prohibition to function, even though it, like the
Cohen bond requirement, might prevent actions that would otherwise
have gone forward.207
The argument has some force, because the cases are similar in that
way. But it overlooks the fact that Cohen used Guaranty Trust’s
talismanic outcome-determinative test, which Byrd rejected even for the
Erie line of cases. Seven years after Byrd, Hanna declared the Erie
analysis wholly inappropriate for Federal Rules cases. Thus, the Cohen
approach, on which Justice Ginsburg relied, was twice outmoded. To
borrow from Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion in Cohen, which
Justice Frankfurter joined, New York’s prohibition of the class action
device “does not add one iota to nor subtract one iota from”208 the claim

201. For example, New York had a statutory cap on wrongful death damages in the midnineteenth century. See John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American
Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1168 & n.51 (2005). This lasted until the Constitution of 1894
forbade such a limit. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1894); Witt, supra, at 1169 & n.59. Nonetheless,
the current version of that New York constitutional provision specifically permits the legislature to
set limits on recovery for death in workers’ compensation cases. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18.
202. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465-66.
203. Id. at 1466 (footnote omitted).
204. Id. at 1464.
205. See id. at 1462-63, 1468; supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
206. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan. Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 544 & n.1, 555-57 (1949).
207. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1462-63, 1468.
208. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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that every insurance beneficiary (or its assignee) has against an insurer
in Allstate’s position.209
The justices’ differing views about section 901(b), however, divert
attention from the far more central question of how the Court ought to
read the Federal Rules when considering an REA challenge. That
requires understanding the purpose of the REA’s limiting language. As
Professor Stephen B. Burbank explains:
The historical evidence compels the view that the limitations imposed
by the famous first two sentences of the Act . . . were intended to
allocate power between the Supreme Court as rule-maker and
Congress and thus to circumscribe the delegation of legislative power,
that they were thought to be equally relevant in all actions brought in
federal court, and that the protection of state law was deemed a
probable effect, rather than the primary purpose, of the allocation
scheme established by the Act. In this aspect the history starkly
contradicts the notion, shared by the Supreme Court and many
commentators, that the basic purpose of the Act’s procedure/substance
dichotomy is to allocate law-making power between the federal
210
government and the states.

Therefore, to regard the REA’s limiting language as a federalism
instrument, rather than as a separation-of-powers instrument, is to
indulge in a serious misreading of the REA’s history and timing. As the
Ninth Circuit has recognized, adopting Professor Burbank’s view:
Because the Rules Enabling Act was enacted in 1934, four years
before the Court decided Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins . . . its
proviso restricting the permissible scope of the rules could not have
been designed to serve the purposes of Erie and thereby to ensure the
primacy of state law. Rather, the proviso was designed to serve the

209. The court’s decision in Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc. is analogous. 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn.
1942); see supra note 12 and accompanying text. The court in Jeub found:
That the rights over and against Swift and Company, which B/G Foods may have by
reason of any loss sustained by it, must be governed by the substantive laws of this State
is entirely clear. The invoking of the third-party procedural practice must not do violence
to the substantive rights of the parties. However, an acceleration of an expedition of the
presentation of such rights does not conflict with any Minnesota law.
Jeub, 2 F.R.D. at 240. Perhaps even more to the point, the court noted:
The apparent purpose of Rule 14 is to provide suitable machinery whereby the rights of
all parties may be determined in one proceeding . . . . Otherwise, B/G Foods, Inc., would
be required to await the outcome of the present suit, and then if plaintiffs recover, to
institute an independent action for contribution or indemnity. The rule under
consideration was promulgated to avoid this very circuity of proceeding.
Id. at 241. One can make exactly the same point about Rule 23.
210. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025-26
(1982) (footnotes omitted).
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purposes of the anti-delegation doctrine by limiting the scope of rules
211
that were adopted with minimal congressional involvement.

Neither court nor commentator has disputed that characterization. Even
if Professor Burbank and the Ninth Circuit were mistaken about the
office of the REA’s limiting language, that would neither explain nor
justify the approach to the REA questions that, following Shady Grove, a
majority of the justices appear to favor.
V.

EVALUATING FEDERAL RULES FOR REA COMPLIANCE

For reasons that are not clear, the Court has used two quite distinct
methods in reading the Federal Rules. To determine the scope of a
Rule—whether it speaks to the issue sub judice—the Court looks only at
its language, almost defiantly refusing to make inferences. Walker
demonstrates that particularly well. Statutes of limitations prescribe how
long a claimant has to commence his action on an accrued claim.212 Rule
3 defines commencement, yet the Walker Court declined to apply it
because it does not mention statutes of limitations.213 That is all the more
remarkable because Rule 3 is the stopping point for federal limitations
periods.214 Palmer, which antedates Guaranty Trust, Byrd, Hanna, and
211. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002); accord, United States v.
Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312, 1325 (D. Minn. 1988). In United States v. Myers, a decision antedating
Sain, one district court cited Professor Burbank as taking the opposite position, but the district court
overlooked that the language upon which it relied expressed not Professor Burbank’s own view, but
rather his summary of the mess the Court had made of interpreting the REA. 687 F. Supp. 1403,
1414-15 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that the REA’s substance/procedure distinction “enunciated for
the purposes of demarcating state and federal rule-making power, not determining the proper
allocation of power within the federal government”); see also Burbank, supra note 210, at 1027-28.
In any event, the Ninth Circuit’s contrary view supersedes that of the district court.
212. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (“[S]tatute[s] establishing a
time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued.”). The problem arises
because different legal systems have different views about what constitutes commencement for the
purposes of a given statute of limitation. For example, in 1992, New York shifted some of its courts
from a commencement-by-service system to a commencement-by-filing system. David D. Siegel,
Appellate Judges Disagree – with Fatal Results for Plaintiff – About When and Whether to Extend
to 120-Period for Summons Service When “Good Cause” Not Shown, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV., Jan.
2001, at 1, 2. Other courts, generally those inferior to the New York general jurisdiction trial court,
remained on a commencement-by-service system, although New York subsequently added some
lower courts to the commencement-by-filing system. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 304 cmt. 1 (McKinney
2010). Sometimes, even the same legal system has divergent views. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.16.170 (West 2005) (marking commencement at either filing the complaint or serving the
summons, “whichever occurs first”).
213. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987). The Court declared:
[W]e now hold that when the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the
absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a
limitations period from another statute, the action is not barred if it has been
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Walker, is equally persuasive.215 Just as Rule 3 says nothing about
limitations periods, Rule 8(c) is silent about burdens of proof, and the
Court refused to read it as affecting them.216 It is no exaggeration to say
that the Court has taken a read-my-lips approach to questions about the
scope of Federal Rules.217 In its view, Federal Rules reach only what
their language says.
With respect to REA problems, however, some justices’ approaches
have been quite different. Shady Grove illustrates that. The justices
divided sharply into two camps on how to determine whether a Rule
violates the REA. Justice Scalia’s plurality thought the Court should not
look at state law at all to evaluate an REA challenge. That method is
consistent with Sibbach and with the direct-conflict approach Hanna
prescribed. The other justices thought it essential to look at the
conflicting state law to see whether it is substantive, viewing state and
federal law side-by-side.218 The latter approach is reminiscent of
Byrd, with its emphasis on balancing. Yet, as Hanna instructed, the
Erie-Guaranty Trust-Byrd analysis is not appropriate if there is a Federal
Rule directly on point.
The unanswered question is why some of the justices use such
radically different approaches to determine: (1) to what situations a
Federal Rule applies, and (2) whether it exceeds the limitations of the
REA. Of course, it is commonplace to use different analyses for
different purposes.219 The point here, however, is that the purposes are
“commenced” in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed period.
Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sain, 309 F.3d at 1138 (finding
that Rule 3 specifies the time at which borrowed state limitations periods start in § 1983 actions);
supra note 127 and accompanying text.
215. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1943) (discussing Rule 8(c)’s silence as to
which party has the burden of establishing contributory negligence); supra notes 63-70 and
accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 76-106, 129-31 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 176-84.
219. For example, equal protection analysis varies according to whether the individual is a
member of a suspect class (requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored and necessary to
achieve a compelling government interest), a quasi-suspect class (requiring the classification be
substantially related to an important government interest), or the populace at large (requiring only
that the classification bear a rational relationship to some permissible government goal). See JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 687-88 (7th ed. 2004). Similarly, one
may be competent to make a will—
[t]estamentary capacity exists when the testator has intelligent knowledge of the natural
objects of his bounty, the general composition of his estate, and what he wants done with
it, even if his memory is impaired by age or disease, and the testator need not have the
ability to conduct business affairs
—but incompetent to stand trial on a criminal charge, “measured by the capacity to understand the
proceedings, to consult meaningfully with counsel, and to assist in the defense.” In re Bosley, 26
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the same. In both situations the question is whether a Rule speaks to an
issue (without regard to whether the issue is substantive or procedural).
On the application side, the Court is clear: if the Rule does not address
the issue explicitly, the Rule does not apply. There is no good reason for
not using the same approach on the REA side: if the Rule does not
explicitly speak to a substantive issue, it does not govern that issue and
therefore cannot violate the REA. The question should be whether the
Rule articulates a procedural regulation or a substantive one. Read-mylips clarity is the Court’s approach, but only some of the time.
The advantage of the read-my-lips approach is obvious. It is a
clearer, better-demarcated approach than the one that five of the Shady
Grove justices urged. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent talked about whether
the state rule is “outcome affective,” but that is the wrong question, and
she asked it of the wrong rule.220 It is a throwback to Guaranty Trust,
which is no longer appropriate even in non-Federal Rules cases. The
issue is not whether a state rule is outcome affective; it is whether a
Federal Rule “abridge[s], enlarge[s] or modif[ies] any substantive
right.”221 The REA directs attention to what the Federal Rule seeks to
accomplish, not to the incidental effects that a Federal Rule may have on
state law.
Justice Ginsburg was concerned about forum shopping, as was
Erie. Referring to the RDA, not the REA, Justice Ginsberg declared:
“That Act directs federal courts, in diversity cases, to apply state law
when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and yield markedly
disparate litigation outcomes.”222 That does not help solve the Shady
Grove problem, because Shady Grove is not an RDA case. The issue is
whether Rule 23 violates the REA. The Court has never read the REA to
include, even implicitly, the same sorts of forum-shopping concerns as
the RDA. The dissent conflated RDA analysis with REA analysis, but
overlooked the lesson of Hanna.223
Justice Ginsburg’s concern is perfectly understandable, but forum
shopping is unavoidable in a multi-governmental system.224 More than

A.3d 1104, 1111-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (9th ed. 2009).
220. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1431, 1471 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
222. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461.
223. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965); supra Part III.
224. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447-48 (majority opinion). Young children intuitively
understand this principle, for it is the rare child who, needing parental permission for some proposed
activity, fails to consider which parent to approach, and the likelihood of getting the desired answer
from each.

834

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:799

that, despite courts’ repeated inveighing against forum shopping,225 it is
a duty that counsel owes to the client as part of the zealous
representation to which the client is entitled.226 Many cases offer the
opportunity for forum shopping, and counsel who fail to take advantage
of that possibility do not serve their clients well. The removal statutes227
and the transfer statutes228 represent congressional recognition of the
existence and legitimacy of forum shopping. In a perfect world, forum
shopping would never produce different results, but we have to live in
this world.
Forum shopping occurs with respect to vertical and horizontal
choice-of-law problems. A single automobile accident may generate
inconsistent outcomes depending on the forum. States have different
choice-of-law rules that lead to different results. The Constitution has
little to say about choice of law.229 It is possible that a particular choice
in a particular case may violate the Due Process Clause230 or the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,231 but such cases are rare because the tests the
Court uses are so narrow.
Litigants may prefer certain forums, perceiving substantive or
procedural advantages. The REA Congress, however, was not concerned
about forum shopping. It worried instead that the Supreme Court, in
promulgating the Federal Rules, might tread on Congress’s own
prerogatives to create federal substantive law, a concern that subsequent
action by the Court involving New Deal legislation demonstrated had a
sound basis.232
225. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467 (reiterating that unfairness results if forum shopping
occurs); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (using injustice and confusion as reasons
against forum shopping); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Hanna on the importance of avoiding forum shopping); Feinstein v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d
880, 884 (1st Cir. 1981) (discussing Erie’s evils of forum shopping and inequitable administration
of the law).
226. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2013); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983).
227. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1447 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
228. See id. §§ 1404, 1406.
229. “[Allstate Insurance Co.] v. Hague and its progeny establish that choice-of-law doctrine is
largely a matter of state law, and that constitutional intervention will be rare.” HAY ET AL., supra
note 37, at 193; see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Hague “indicated that,
for now at least, only minimal constitutional scrutiny will be imposed on a state’s conflicts
decisions.” RUSSEL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 669 (6th ed. 2010)
(footnote omitted).
230. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 14950 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930).
231. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985); Bradford Elec. Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932).
232. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133 (1995). William E. Leuchtenburg states:
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Recall the historical context in which Congress passed the REA.
The Depression was in full swing,233 and Franklin D. Roosevelt was in
the second year of his presidency.234 The view that the Court was
reactionary—out of touch with the times—was widespread,235 and
eventually led to the ill-fated court-packing proposal.236 Suspicion of the
Court ran high. Congress was willing to delegate procedural rule-making
power to the Court, but it included three safeguards of its own
Early in the New Deal, the Supreme Court had appeared willing to uphold novel
legislation, but in the spring of 1935 the roof had fallen in. Justice Roberts joined the
Four Horsemen to invalidate a rail pension law, that thereafter Roberts voted consistently
with the conservatives. Later that same month, on “Black Monday,” May 27, 1935, the
Court, this time in a unanimous decision, demolished the National Industrial Recovery
Act. In the next year, the Court, by a 6-3 vote . . . , struck down the Agricultural
Adjustment Act with an opinion by Justice Roberts that provoked a blistering dissent
from Justice Stone, took special pains to knock out the Guffey Coal Act in the Carter [v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)] case, and in [Morehead v. New York ex. rel.]
Tipaldo[, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)] invalidated a New York minimum wage law. “Never in a
single year before or since,” Max Lerner later wrote, “has so much crucial legislation
been undone, so much declared public policy nullified.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
233. See DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 113 (2012).
234. See id. at 114.
235. For an extended discussion of the Court’s interaction with New Deal legislation and its
effect on popular views of the Court, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 82-132. A Daily News
editorial shortly after the 1936 election expressed this interaction as follows:
The power of the nine men whose average age is 71 must be curtailed somehow, or the
will of the people as expressed in their return of the New Deal to power will be thwarted.
....
. . . The power the Supreme Court has taken to itself—to nullify any laws it does not
like—must be taken from it if our progress is to continue.
Op-Ed., Roosevelt Wins, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1936, at 35.
By the end of 1936, it had become commonplace to refer to the justices as “the nine old
men.” LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 119. Leuchtenburg further describes this phrasing:
A.A. Berle, a member of the Brain Trust, had used the term [the nine old men] in passing
in 1933, and a column in a Kentucky newspaper reflected a popular notion when it
referred to the Court as ‘nine old back-number owls (appointed by by-gone Presidents)
who sit on the leafless, fruitless limb of an old dead tree.’ But it was the publication on
October 26, 1936, of The Nine Old Men by the widely circulated columnists Drew
Pearson and Robert S. Allen that made the phrase a household expression.
Id. at 119.
236. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 112, 114-15 (discussing the court-packing
proposal). The idea did not spring from President Roosevelt. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR
CONSTITUTION 313 (2006); see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 120. Peter Irons explains:
Back in 1914, an earlier attorney general had proposed adding one judge to lower federal
courts for every sitting judge who had reached the age of seventy. ‘This will insure at all
times,’ the proposal’s author wrote, ‘the presence of a judge sufficiently active to
discharge promptly and adequately all the duties of the court.’ That proposal came from
James McReynolds, now seventy-two and the most dogmatic of the Four Horsemen of
Reaction on the Supreme Court.
IRONS, supra, at 313.
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prerogatives: the limiting language of the REA,237 the preservation of
Congress’s power effectively to veto proposed rules before they went
into effect,238 and the proviso that “[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing,
or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless
approved by Act of Congress.”239 It could hardly be clearer that
Congress’s concern in enacting the REA was its effect on separation of
powers, not its effect on federalism.240 Finally, Congress’s acquiescence
in Rule 23’s iterations from 1938 to the present is some evidence—not
dispositive, certainly—that Congress did not perceive Rule 23 as
violating the REA’s limiting language.
The approach that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg advocated leaves
the Court, as Rules promulgator, in an impossible position. If the content
of state law is the measure of a Federal Rule’s legitimacy, then, in order
to ensure compliance with the REA, the Court needs to do a fifty-state
survey before it propounds any Rule or amendment. It cannot otherwise
ensure that the Rule complies with the REA even when drafted. Worse,
the Stevens-Ginsburg approach means that a Federal Rule, compliant
with the REA when promulgated, may become non-compliant when
states change their laws.241 Finally, a Federal Rule may simultaneously
be REA-compliant in one state, but not so in an identical case in
another—so much for uniform federal procedure. Surely the 1934
Congress could not have had that in mind when it enacted the REA.
Even if one thinks that Congress intended the limiting language of
the REA to serve federalism rather than separation of powers,242 it
should make no difference. Since Hanna nearly half a century ago, the
Court has consistently said that the Federal Rules mean only what they
say explicitly. That compels the conclusion that, if a Federal Rule does
not explicitly address a substantive right, it does not run afoul
of the REA.

237. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
238. See id. § 2074(a).
239. Id. § 2074(b).
240. See Burbank, supra note 210, at 1036. Professor Burbank adds:
In the end, as in the beginning, of the movement, the high ground in the debate about the
uniform federal procedure bill involved the allocation of lawmaking power between the
Supreme Court as rule-maker and Congress. State interests as such were acknowledged
only late in the course of the bill’s pre-1934 history. Their protection was deemed a
consequence, not the goal, of the bill’s procedure/substance dichotomy.
Id.
241. To be sure, changes in the U.S. Constitution may have the effect of invalidating
previously enacted legislation, but the apparent analogy is false. Under the Supremacy Clause, the
Constitution is superior to ordinary legislation. State law, however, is not superior to federal law.
242. See supra notes 206-22 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Court should heed its own approach in cases like Palmer,
Walker, and Burlington Northern, and especially the wisdom of Dr.
Seuss: the Federal Rules say what they mean, and they mean what they
say243—and not anything else. If a Federal Rule does not specifically
address a substantive right, then it does not violate the REA.244 The
Stevens-Ginsburg approach threatens to undercut Congress’s desire that
the federal courts have uniform rules of procedure, untethered to state
law.245 It creates for the Federal Rules the same problem that Guaranty
Trust’s outcome-determinative test did.246 To ask whether a state rule is
“outcome-affective,” as Justice Ginsburg did, is to launch an inquiry
both broad and formless. Even the sentence in which Justice Ginsburg
adverted to “outcome-affective” raises problems:
In short, Shady Grove’s effort to characterize [section] 901(b) as
simply ‘procedural’ cannot successfully elide this fundamental norm:
When no federal law or rule is dispositive of an issue, and a state
statute is outcome affective in the sense our cases on Erie (pre and
post-Hanna) develop, the Rules of Decision Act commands application
247
of the State’s law in diversity suits.

At the outset, the sentence assumes the conclusion that no Federal Rule
applied, but that was the first question in Shady Grove. Even the
dissenters seemed to accept that Rule 23 applied by its own terms,
though they urged that the Court should interpret it to avoid the
conflict.248 The real issue was whether New York’s contrary rule could
displace Rule 23. The Shady Grove dissent represents, in essence, a
retreat to the method of Guaranty Trust, an implicit rejection of Hanna,
and a concomitant return to the Erie analysis under the RDA, but the
RDA does not control the Federal Rules.249
243. See supra notes 2, 69-76, 101-16 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Parts III–IV; see also supra notes 34-75 and accompanying text.
247. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1471 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
248. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465-69.
249. Even if one considers it possible that the RDA speaks to the Federal Rules (an interesting
proposition, given that the 1789 Congress that passed both the RDA and the Process Act
contemplated only that state procedure would govern litigation in the federal courts), the REA
supersedes it because it is far more specific. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir.
1998) (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, 2B STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (5th ed.
1992)) (“But it is elementary that a more recent and specific statute is reconciled with a more
general, older one by treating the more specific as an exception which controls in the circumstances
to which it applies.”); see also supra notes 10-11.
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Any procedural rule can affect substantive rights; the Court’s
experience with, and Hanna’s rejection of, Guaranty Trust’s method as
applied to the Federal Rules bear explicit witness to that. But the
ancillary effect on substantive rights that a Federal Rule may have is not
the issue at which the 1934 Congress aimed. The Federal Rules may not
prescribe abridgments, enlargements or modifications of substantive
rights, state or federal. As long as they refrain from doing so, they satisfy
the REA’s command.

